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Abstract 
In neoclassical economics, individuals are assumed to perceive tax payments as 
commensurate with any other payment. This paper challenges this assumption. 
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 3
Introduction 
 
 
The question of whether to commit more resources to policies designed to deter tax 
evasion is difficult to resolve. Policymakers argue that the social benefit is the 
increase in tax revenue (Pyle, 1979; Skinner & Slemrod, 1985) but these claims are 
spurious.1 If tax revenue is a transfer (within a community), tax revenue is not an 
increase in ‘social output’ (e.g. Collard, 1989). Other considerations are more relevant 
when estimating the ‘social benefits’ of policy designed to increase tax compliance 
(Pyle, 1989; Cullis & Jones, 2009). In this paper, the objective is to focus on the 
argument that one social benefit of increased tax compliance is an increase in citizens’ 
involvement in their community.  
 
The usual assumption in neoclassical public finance theory is that tax is a payment 
commensurate with other payments (tax is simply a cost that must be paid). As 
individuals have no property rights to the payments they make in markets, they have 
no incentive to retain any residual (or ‘follow on’) interest in these payments. But, as 
taxpayers, citizens are members of a community and the community will spend their 
tax payments.  
 
It is easy to discount the importance of a residual interest in the way that tax might be 
spent.  Each individual pays such a small contribution of total tax revenue and 
expenditure decisions are made collectively. However, this ignores the observation 
that, as individuals pay an ever increasing share of their income in tax, they become 
                                                 
1 In evidence to the Public Accounts Committee (1981–2) the Inland Revenue stated that in 1981 the 
yield (in extra revenue) from investigative work was £92 000 per official (Pyle, 1979). This sum of 
money would exceed the costs of employing a tax investigator. Similarly, Skinner and Slemrod (1985) 
cite the estimates of the Inland Revenue Service Commissioner to indicate that every extra dollar of 
resources allocated to the IRS could be expected to bring in more than 10 dollars in tax revenue. 
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increasingly aware that their own interest and the community’s interest are very 
closely entwined.  It also ignores the observation that, when individuals pay more tax 
to fulfil civic duty, they become more conscious of their civic duty to participate in 
the life of the community. As tax compliance increases, individuals are more inclined 
to identify with their community and to take a greater interest in politics.  
 
There are social benefits if individuals take a greater interest in their community. John 
Stuart Mill (1861/1991: 255) argued that, when a citizen participates, the citizen “…is 
called upon while so engaged to weight interests not his own; to be guided, in case of 
conflicting calls, by another rule than his own private partialities”. Coleman (1966) 
argued that individuals have a social ordering of preferences that may take precedence 
over a private ordering. There are also arguments (drawn from welfare economics) 
that, when individuals identify with the community, they are more inclined to 
internalise externalities into their decision-making calculus. The extent to which such 
increased involvement in the community is beneficial is moot (Dagger, 1975; Segal, 
2005) but, if there are advantages, is it really the case that tax compliance will 
increase individuals’ interest in their community?  
 
The following section of the paper considers the way that increased tax compliance 
increases citizens’ interests in their community. It amends the received neoclassical 
model (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972) to illustrate the impact of instrumental and 
intrinsic motivation.  Section three presents the model used to test the hypothesis that 
increased tax compliance increases citizens’ interest in politics. Later sections of the 
paper discuss the results and the policy implications. 
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2. Tax Compliance and Citizens’ Interest in Politics  
 
This section of the paper focuses on the impact of policy designed to increase tax 
compliance. With increased tax compliance, both instrumental and intrinsically-
motivated citizens are likely to take a greater interest in politics:  
 
(i) Instrumental motivation: Instrumental individuals take action to change outcomes. 
Behavioral predictions are premised on the way they respond to changes in price and 
income constraints (Stigler & Becker, 1977).  Figure 1 illustrates the policy response 
of a representative individual. 
 
In Figure 1 quadrant II, the slope of the individual’s indifference curve I1 is the ratio of 
expected marginal utility of income if the individual evades detection, to the expected 
marginal utility of income if the individual is caught (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972). The 
slope of the budget line 1-2 reflects the ‘price’ of honesty. When the individual 
maximizes welfare at point 2, the individual is completely honest (declaring all income 
and enjoying disposable income Yt). When the individual optimizes at point 1 
(completely dishonest  - declaring no income) the individual fears an audit because, if  
evasion is detected, the individual will be fined and left with a lower income (Yf ) than 
if the individual had declared income honestly (Yt).  
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The individual maximizes welfare at point 3. The level of evasion is [(Y-Yt) -0T1], i.e. 
the difference between honest tax compliance and the preferred level of tax 
compliance. The level of tax compliance (0T1) is reported on the vertical axis of 
quadrant III.  If policymakers increase the fine for evasion the budget line in quadrant 
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II shifts to 2-4  and the individual declares more income (at tangency point 5). Tax 
compliance increases from 0T1 to 0T2.  
 
In quadrant IV, R1 maps the relationship between tax compliance and the interest that 
this instrumental individual takes in politics. In part, the slope of R1 reflects the 
individual’s perception that it is worth acquiring more information because the 
individual’s interest is more closely entwined with the community’s interest. This is 
relevant if the individual believes that it is possible to exert some influence (however 
small) on collective decisions. Statisticians recognise that the probability that a single 
vote might change an electoral outcome is usually minuscule but citizens turn out in 
large numbers in national elections (Aldrich, 1993). Individuals behave as if a single 
vote might prove significant (see Mueller 2003 for a survey). They behave as if they 
exaggerate the significance of a single vote (Clarke et al, 2004). Quattrone and 
Tversky (1986) suggest that they confuse the causal impact of action with the 
diagnostic signal (they vote because they know that if sufficient voted for a preferred 
outcome, this outcome would be achieved - thereby confusing a diagnosis with a 
causal impact).  
 
The prediction is that as tax compliance increases from 0T1 to 0T2 (on the vertical 
axis of Figure 1 quadrant IV), the individual’s interest in politics increases from 0P1 
to 0P2.2   Certainly there is evidence that citizens engage in a principal-agent 
relationship with governments (Besley 2006).  Pommerehne et al (1994) used a 
dynamic, recursive analysis to show that, after each period, each taxpayer revised 
                                                 
2 The additional interest (shown at point 0P2 in quadrant IV) might also be achieved if other policy 
instruments changed taxpayers’ constraints, e.g. an increase in the audit rate. In each case, as the 
individual pays a greater share of income in tax, the individual feels that his/her interests are more 
entwined with those of the community. 
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their commitment having assessed: the deviation between the individual's optimal 
choice of public good provision and the actual level; the tax commitment of fellow 
citizens; the perception that there is government waste.  
 
This paper focuses on the strength of this principal-agent relationship. As individuals 
pay an ever increasing share of their income in tax, they are ever more likely to 
behave as if their own (individual interests) are entwined with those of the 
community. 
  
ii)  Intrinsic motivation:  The architects of utility theory (e.g. Bentham 1789) argued 
that individuals derive value from action (as well as from outcome contingent on 
action) but, as economic theory evolved, attention focused on ‘outcome’ (Lowenstein, 
1999). Figure 1 also illustrates the individual’s response if the individual is 
“...intrinsically motivated to perform an activity when one receives no apparent 
reward except the activity itself…” (Deci, 1971:105).  
 
Empirical studies indicate that perceptions of the intrinsic value of action depend on 
moral considerations and on signals that acknowledge the value of action (e.g. Deci & 
Ryan, 1980; 1985).   Communities often rely on signals to influence perceptions of 
the value of tax compliance. In some communities the policy is to ‘name and shame’ 
miscreants (Gordon, 1989). The way that tax authorities deal with taxpayers (e.g. the 
respect they afford honest taxpayers) is also relevant (Feld & Frey, 2002).   The 
impact of these signals can be illustrated by a shift of the individual’s indifference 
curves when they derive greater intrinsic value from the act of compliance. In Figure 
1 indifference curves shift to the left, e.g. from I1 to I'1. The individual derives 
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intrinsic value from the act of compliance because the individual believes that this is 
the ‘right thing to do’. The new level of declared income is higher (at tangency point 
6).  Once again (tracing the impact of this through quadrants III and IV), it is clear 
that the same level of interest in politics (0P2) is possible. However, it is important to 
emphasise that, if the only motivation is that individuals feel that they should ‘do the 
right thing’, the reason that individuals increase their interest in politics is that policy 
designed to increase perceptions of the intrinsic value of tax compliance spills over, 
and also increases individuals’ perceptions of the intrinsic value of taking an interests 
in their community’s well being.  
 
If both intrinsic and instrumental motivations are relevant, it is important to consider 
whether policy variables are likely to exert consistent responses. Alm, McClelland 
and Schulze (1999) argue that if they do not increase the fine it “… sends out a signal 
to each individual that others do not wish to enforce the tax laws, that it is now 
socially acceptable to evade one’s taxes…”  On the other hand, Frey and Feld (2002) 
sound a note of caution; they suggest that an increase in the fine rate might signal that 
others do not comply and that the community regards evasion as socially acceptable. 
The final impact of policy to deter evasion depends on consistency between 
instrumental and intrinsic responses. Slemrod et al (2001) compared the relative 
importance of different instruments (by sending letters randomly to taxpayers in 
Minnesota before tax returns were due). The threat of audit proved less effective than 
an appeal to individuals’ conscience.   
 
Returning to Figure 1, consider the mix of responses if the fine for evasion is 
increased. In quadrant II the increase in the fine swivels the budget line from 1-2 to  
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2-4 and increases compliance from 0T1 to 0T2.  With instrumental motivation, interest 
in the community increases from 0P1 to 0P2 because the individual hopes to influence 
outcomes but, if signals also enhance the individual’s perception of the intrinsic value 
of involvement in the community, the individual’s interest in the community also 
increases from 0P2 to 0P3.  The full impact of the policy variable is now a shift from 
point 3” to 5'''.  
 
If both instrumental and intrinsic motivations are relevant, the prediction is that 
increased tax compliance will increase individuals’ identity with the community and 
increases individuals’ interest in politics. 
 
3. An Empirical Analysis of Tax Compliance and Citizens’ Interest in Politics.  
 
A well-established empirical literature already indicates that tax compliance increases 
if individuals are able to participate in collective decision-making (e.g. Kidder & 
McEwan, 1989).  In experiments, subjects are more tax compliant if they are offered 
the opportunity to participate in collective decisions (e.g. Tyran & Feld, 2001). 
Studies compare participation in direct and representative democracies and indicate 
that citizens are more tax compliant if they feel they have a greater say, i.e. if they 
participate in direct democracy (e.g. Pommerhene & Weck-Hanneman, 1996). 
Increased awareness of collective decisions is important because collective decisions 
inform individuals’ perceptions of the intrinsic value of the social norm of tax 
compliance (Alm, McClelland & Schulze, 1999).  But is there a reverse causation? To 
our knowledge, this is the first attempt to assess whether increased tax compliance 
increases individuals’ interest in collective decisions.  
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(i) The Data  
 
Data can be drawn from the World Values Survey (WVS). The WVS provides cross-
country comparisons of values and attitudes relating to life, family, work, religion, the 
economy and political engagement.  To date, four waves have been carried out: 1981-
1984, 1990-1993, 1995-1997 and 1999-2004. In this paper analysis is based on 
responses from Wave 4. The focus is on countries sampled in 1999, providing data on 
over 20 countries.  
 
Individuals’ willingness to comply with tax is gauged with reference to the extent (1 
never justifiable to 10 always justifiable) to which individuals agreed with the 
question: 
Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be 
justified, never be justified, or something in between: 
 
 Cheating on taxes if you have a chance 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
            
 
The WVS also reports the extent to which citizens take an interest in politics. 
Respondents were also asked: 3 
 
How interested would you say you are in politics? 
1 Very interested 
2 Somewhat interested 
3 Not very interested 
4 Not at all interested 
 
 
There are always concerns when analyzing questionnaire responses, but this is the 
usual source of data when analyzing an individual’s tax evasion (see Schneider & 
                                                 
3 In the regression analysis that follows in Section 3(ii) we reverse the coding of this variable so the 
first category relates to not at all interested, the second category not very interested and so on. 
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Enste 2000 for a literature review).  While this data is sensitive to the reliability of 
responses, it is the only independently available data for analysis at the level of the 
individual. 4  
 
As a first indication, consider the relationship between tax compliance and political 
interest illustrated in Figure 2.  
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Source: Authors’ calculations based on average responses from the World Values Survey (1999). 
 
Figure 2. The Relationship between Tax Compliance and Political Interest 
 
 
Political interest is measured on the vertical axis with lower values representing 
higher levels of interest.  Likewise, tax compliance is constructed so that lower values 
are associated with higher levels of tax compliance.  The plot is divided into four 
quadrants, based on the mean values for political interest and tax compliance.  For 
                                                 
4 There are many other ways of estimating tax evasion in different countries but if proxies are required 
of tax evasion by individuals this is the only meaningful data set in the public domain. 
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example, countries appearing in the top-right quadrant (Austria, Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Iceland, Bulgaria and Ireland) represent high levels of tax compliance with 
relatively high levels of interest in politics.  Interestingly, seven countries (including 
Spain, Portugal and Argentina) appear in the quadrant represented by high levels of 
tax compliance but low levels of political interest.  Only Luxembourg, Belgium and 
France appear in the bottom-left quadrant. 
 
While the objective is to consider the impact of socio-demographic variables (e.g. 
age, income, gender, education), it is important to note that ethnic fragmentation and 
the degree of corruption in countries have proved relevant in studies that have 
estimated the extent to which citizens identify with their community:   
 
(i) Ethnic Fragmentation:  Studies (e.g. Alesina et al., 1999; 2003) indicate that 
participation in social activities and trust in institutions are reduced by ethnic 
fractionalization.  Figures 3 and 4 suggest that ethnic fragmentation reduces citizens’ 
interest in politics and citizens’ willingness to comply with tax.  
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Figure 3: The Relationship between Political Interest and Ethnic Fractionalization 
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Figure 4: The Relationship between Tax Compliance and Ethnic Fractionalization 
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(ii) Corruption There is also evidence that individuals are less willing to engage in 
politics if they believe that politics is rife with corruption (Dong & Torgler, 2009). A 
specific index based on the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) produced by 
Transparency International was constructed using a ten point scale (1-10) where a 
higher score is indicative of less corruption. CPI measures the level of corruption that 
is perceived to exist in a particular country using survey responses from business 
people, the general public and country analysts. 5 The relationships with interest in 
politics and with tax compliance are illustrated in Figures 5 and 6. 6 
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Figure 5: The Relationship between Political Interest and Corruption 
                                                 
5 Other corruption indices are available, these include International Country Risk Guide and Quality of 
Government (Control of Corruption) developed by Kaufmann et al. (2003).   
6 Details of the CPI and ethnic fractionalization indices by country are provided in Table A.1. 
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Figure 6: The Relationship between Tax Compliance and Corruption 
 
 
A comparison of these figures suggests that the relationships between political 
interest, ethnic fractionalization and corruption follow similar trends.  Less ethnic 
fractionalization appears to be negatively associated with political interest and tax 
compliance. Less corruption appears to be positively associated with political interest. 
While there appears to be a strong relationship between tax compliance and ethnic 
fractionalization (Figure 4), the relationship between tax compliance and corruption 
appears weaker (Figure 6). 
 
(ii)  The Model and the Results 
 
To begin, it is worth considering the results when a standard ordered probit model is 
used for estimation. In Table 1 they indicate that interest in politics is lowest across 
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the youngest age groups (only becoming positive for those aged 45 years and older).  
Females are typically less interested in politics compared to their male counterparts. 
University-educated respondents and respondents in the higher income bracket are 
more likely to be interested in politics.  Employment status also matters, with the 
unemployed and self-employed typically less interested in politics. A higher level of 
ethnic fractionalization is associated with less engagement in politics. A better 
corruption score (which is indicative of less corruption) is associated with greater 
interest in politics.  Finally, and of most relevance to this paper, tax compliance is 
statistically significant.  This variable is coded as a dummy dichotomous variable 
which equals one if the respondent is less likely to cheat on taxes and zero if they are 
more likely to cheat on taxes.  Therefore the sign of the coefficient suggests that tax 
compliance is positively associated with political interest.      
 
The problem with this estimation is that, while tax compliance appears a significant 
determinant of interest in politics, there are likely to be unobserved factors affecting 
tax compliance that are correlated with unobserved heterogeneity in the political 
engagement equation.  Consistent with the figures presented earlier, it is possible for 
example that ethnic fractionalization and perceived corruption also influence the level 
of tax compliance.  
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Table 1: Tax Compliance and Political Interest: Ordered Probit Model 
Variable Coefficient Standard Error 
Age1824 -0.394*** 0.030 
Age2534 -0.289*** 0.025 
Age3544 -0.126*** 0.025 
Age4554 0.005 0.026 
Age5564 0.093*** 0.027 
Female -0.359*** 0.015 
Married -0.014 0.016 
University Education 0.516*** 0.018 
Self Employed -0.098*** 0.030 
Unemployed -0.166*** 0.030 
Lower Income -0.138*** 0.018 
Higher Income 0.136*** 0.018 
Tax Compliance 0.045** 0.022 
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.164*** 0.049 
Lower Corruption 0.048*** 0.015 
 
1μ  -0.0994 0.037 
2μ  -0.063 0.036 
3μ  1.008 0.037 
N 22307 
 
LR Test 
 
2292.23 
 
Pseudo R2 
 
0.039 
Note:**, ***, significant at the 5% and 1% levels of significance respectively. 
 
To deal with the combination of a potentially endogenous discrete variable and a 
discrete dependent variable, an endogenous switching framework model is employed.  
Political interest (y) is the dependent variable and tax compliance (T) is the regime 
switch.  Following Miranda and Rabe-Hesketh (2005), we construct the model as a 
system of equations for two latent response variables: 
 
iiii uTy +′+= βxα*        (1) 
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Where *iy represents a latent continuous variable, α is the coefficient associated with 
the endogenous variable, β represents a K x 1 vector of parameters associated with the 
demographic, socio-economic and country-specific characteristics (i.e. the variables 
listed in Table 2) and iu  is an error term.   
 iii vT +′= λz*         (2) 
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Where *iT represents a latent continuous variable, λ  a L x 1 vector of parameters and 
iv  an error term
7.  λ  is identical to β  but with the addition of trust in other citizens, 
which is used to identify the model (as will be discussed shortly). 
 
In what follows, the assumption is a bivariate normal distribution for the error terms 
from which we can deduce the level of correlation (ρ).8  If ρ=0 (i.e. no dependence 
between iu  and iv ) then iT can be considered exogenous.  In such circumstances 
equation (1) can be estimated using standard ordered probit methods (as in Table 1).  
On the other hand, if ρ≠0 then iT  is considered endogenous.  In this case, using 
                                                 
7 In order to operationalise the endogenous switching model we assume the coefficient associated with 
the endogenous variable is binary. 
8 Details are provided in Miranda and Rabe-Hesketh (2005). 
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standard ordered probit methods will generate inconsistent estimators.  As such, 
exogenous switching will be nested within the endogenous switching framework. 
 
To consider whether exogenous switching is nested within an endogenous switching 
framework a further test considers the impact of one additional variable. Studies 
report that tax compliance is influenced by how others behave (Fischbacher & 
Gachter, 2006) and by the extent to which they trust others (Frey & Torgler, 2007).9  
In this paper, trust in others is used to identify the model.  A priori, higher levels of 
trust are likely to explain higher levels of tax compliance. However, a priori the 
impact of trust on political engagement is ambiguous. While it is possible that citizens 
might take a greater interest the more that they believe that they can trust others, it is 
also possible that that they are more concerned about their ‘stake’ in the community 
the more they question that they are able to trust others. For example, the more widely 
politicians’ ‘affairs’ are publicized, the greater the interest that citizens may take in 
the lives of their political representatives.10  
 
The estimates from the endogenous switching model are reported in Table 2.  Based 
on the results of the switching equation (Column 3), trust and corruption are both 
positively associated with tax compliance.  This implies that respondents who trust 
are more likely to comply with taxes.  Ethnic fractionalization is negatively associated 
                                                 
9 Frey and Torgler (2007) estimate a tax compliance equation based on the European Values Survey 
that includes conditional cooperation variables relating to trust in the judicial system and trust in the 
parliament. Their equation also includes a variable which captures each individual’s satisfaction with 
democracy together with standard demographic and socio-economic factors such as age, gender, 
education and income.  Finally, they also include country fixed effects to capture unobserved 
differences across countries.  In contrast this paper uses ethnic fractionalization and corruption index to 
capture some of these country-specific effects. 
10 This is quite different from the negative impact that persistent reports of endemic corruption might 
exert on citizens interest in politics. 
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with tax compliance.  Therefore, a higher level of ethnic fractionalization is associated 
with less tax compliance.   
 
Table 2: Tax Compliance and Political Interest: Endogenous Switch Ordered Probit 
Model 
 Political 
Interest 
Tax 
Compliance 
(Switching 
Model) 
Variable   
Age1824 -0.393*** (0.030) -0.338*** (0.101) 
Age2534 -0.288*** (0.025) -0.331*** (0.088) 
Age3544 -0.126*** (0.025) -0.181** (0.090) 
Age4554 0.005 (0.026) -0.049 (0.095) 
Age5564 0.093*** (0.027) 0.029 (0.097) 
Female -0.359*** (0.015) 0.107** (0.049) 
Married -0.014 (0.016) 0.116** (0.055) 
University Education 0.516*** (0.018) 0.033 (0.065) 
Self Employed -0.098*** (0.030) -0.006 (0.095) 
Unemployed -0.166*** (0.030) -0.172* (0.104) 
Lower Income -0.138*** (0.018) -0.038 (0.064) 
Higher Income 0.136*** (0.018) -0.098* (0.059) 
Tax Compliance 0.053** (0.025)  
Trust  0.228*** (0.051) 
Ethnic Fractionalization -0.162*** (0.049) -1.838*** (0.153) 
Lower Corruption 0.049*** (0.015) 
 
0.200*** (0.052) 
1μ  -0.986*** (0.039) 
2μ  -0.055 (0.038) 
3μ  1.089*** (0.039) 
ρ -0.020 (0.032) 
 
Wald Test 
 
2518.88 (0.000) 
 
 
N 27644 
  
Notes: standard errors in parentheses.  *, **, ***, significant at the 10%, 5% and  
1% levels of significance respectively. 
 
In terms of the socio-demographic variables, tax compliance is higher amongst 
females and respondents who are married.  Age is also an important determinant, 
whereas education and employment status are statistically insignificant. 
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Turning to the political interest equation (column 2), the results are similar to those 
reported in Table 1.  The key result is that, once the endogeneity status of tax 
compliance is controlled for, those who are more likely to comply with taxes are more 
engaged in politics.  The negative value for ρ suggests a negative correlation between 
the unobservable factors affecting tax compliance and political engagement. 
Invariably, we would have expected this parameter to be positive, since political 
engagement and tax compliance are both related to civic engagement. However, the 
parameter is insignificant.  Given the similarity between the political engagement 
variables in the two approaches, it would appear that tax compliance in this model is 
exogenous. 
 
As a further consideration (and in order to test the robustness of our results) the tax 
compliance equation was re-estimated using standard ordered and binary probit 
frameworks (Table 3).  The binary probit results (Model 1) are consistent with the 
results presented in the endogenous switching approach. There are also similarities 
between the binary response model and the ordered probit (Model 2), but also some 
differences.  In particular, whereas previously self-employed and unemployed 
variables were insignificant both are now significant (at better than the 5% level).  
Finally, in Model 3 we again apply an ordered probit but now include political interest 
(in binary form) as an additional explanatory variable.  Despite marginally increasing 
the goodness of fit and having the correct (positive) sign it is statistically insignificant.  
From this, we (tentatively) conclude that tax compliance appears to influence political 
interest more than political interest influences tax compliance.  
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Table 3: Tax Compliance (Robustness Checks) 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Age1824 -0.344*** (0.101) -0.390*** (0.072) -0.375*** (0.073) 
Age2534 -0.333*** (0.088) -0.444*** (0.061) -0.433*** (0.061) 
Age3544 -0.184** (0.090) -0.283*** (0.061) -0.274*** (0.061) 
Age4554 -0.052 (0.095) -0.126** (0.063)  -0.115* (0.064)  
Age5564 0.022 (0.097) -0.080 (0.064) -0.071 (0.064) 
Female 0.104** (0.048) 0.129*** (0.034) 0.137*** (0.034) 
Married 0.113** (0.055) 0.094** (0.039) 0.093** (0.039) 
University Education 0.031 (0.065) -0.059 (0.046) -0.065 (0.046) 
Self Employed -0.011 (0.095) -0.160** (0.062) -0.159** (0.062) 
Unemployed -0.164 (0.103) -0.171** (0.080) -0.188** (0.080) 
Lower Income -0.041 (0.064) -0.018 (0.044) -0.012 (0.044) 
Higher Income -0.099* (0.059) -0.068* (0.041) -0.071* (0.041) 
Trust 0.229*** (0.051) 0.232*** (0.036) 0.229*** (0.036) 
Ethnic Fractionalization -1.813*** (0.152) -1.346*** (0.113) -1.360*** (0.114) 
Lower Corruption 0.197*** (0.051) 0.095*** (0.035) 0.088*** (0.036) 
Political Interest   0.047 (0.036) 
1μ   -1.425*** (0.073) -1.396*** (0.076) 
2μ   -1.127*** (0.073) -1.100*** (0.075) 
3μ   -0.307*** (0.071) -0.278*** (0.074) 
N 4867 4867 4831 
LR Test 272.24 389.73 394.23 
Pseudo R2 0.074 0.035 0.036 
Notes: As table 2. 
 
When relying on both of these tests, the results are consistent with the proposition that 
individuals retain a residual (or ‘follow on’) interest in the payments they make as tax. 
They are consistent with the proposition that instrumental and intrinsic motivations 
are relevant (because socio-economic variables that might explain action premised on 
these motivations are statistically significant). However there is also further evidence 
of the impact of a residual (or ‘follow on’) concern for the way that the community 
will use tax payments.  
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5. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
 
When neoclassical microeconomic theory is applied to analyse taxation, it assumes 
that individuals behave as if tax payment is commensurate with any other payment. 
This paper indicates that the greater the share of income that individuals pay as tax 
and the greater the impact of the perception that they have a civic duty to pay tax, the 
greater the difference between tax payment and other payments made in markets. The 
evidence is that increased tax compliance increases individuals’ ‘follow on’ interest in 
the way tax payments are spent.  
 
In this paper an endogenous-switching-model is applied to estimate the impact of 
variables that influence instrumental and intrinsic motivations. There is evidence that 
these variables (e.g. ethnic fragmentation and politician corruption) are relevant but 
there is also evidence that tax compliance exerts its own statistically significant 
impact on individuals’ interest in politics.  
 
A growing empirical literature (reviewed by Thaler 1996) insists that individuals do 
not regard money as perfectly fungible. This paper presents evidence that individuals 
do not regard tax payments as commensurate with the payments they make in 
markets. This observation is important when reflecting on the dichotomy that 
underpins neoclassical public finance. In neoclassical public finance, tax is a cost to 
the individual but not to the community (because tax revenue is available to be spent 
in the community). Here the evidence is that tax is a cost to the individual but, as the 
individual pays an increasing share of income in tax there is an ever increasing 
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incentive to take a greater interest in politics because tax revenue is available to be 
spent in the community.  
 
These observations are relevant for public finance theory (e.g. when analysing 
individuals’ perceptions of the incidence and cost of tax) and they are also relevant 
when reflecting on unresolved questions in political science (e.g. when explaining 
participation in political decision-making processes). 11 This paper focuses on the way 
that policy might be designed to increase tax compliance. As tax revenues are not the 
only (or the most relevant) estimate of ‘social benefit’ (Collard, 1989) other potential 
social benefits must be considered (e.g. as listed by Pyle, 1989 and Cullis & Jones, 
2009). With John Stuart Mill’s ringing endorsement, this paper indicates the way in 
which increased tax compliance increases individuals’ involvement in politics.  
 
This is a first insight into an inherently enigmatic relationship.  It calls for greater 
consideration of consistency when assessing instrumental and intrinsically-motivated 
responses to policy changes. With this qualification, it supports the proposition that 
policy can be designed to induce ‘good’ citizenship (for other policy examples see 
Frey, 1997; Jones et al, 1998).  The over-arching conclusion is that a carefully 
designed policy to increase tax compliance can increase individuals’ interest in their 
community.  
                                                 
11 As an example, consider the dilemma posed by Frey (1971). He observed that high-income 
individuals participle more in elections than low-income individuals even though the opportunity cost 
of time is higher for high-income individuals. The results in Table 3 shed insight because they indicate 
that, other things equal, income is an important variable when explaining the interest that individuals 
take in politics. 
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Appendix 1 
 
The details of estimates of corruption and ethnic fractionalisation used in the paper 
are shown in Table A1.  
  
Table A1: Corruption and Fractionalization Indices by Country (1999) 
Country Corruption Index 
Score 
Rank Ethnic 
Fractionalization 
Argentina 3.0 71 0.255 
Austria 7.6 17 0.107 
Belgium 5.3 29 0.555 
Bulgaria 3.3 63 0.402 
Croatia 2.7 74 0.369 
Czech Republic 4.6 39 0.322 
Denmark 10 1 0.082 
El Salvador 3.9 49 0.198 
Estonia 5.7 27 0.506 
France 6.6 22 0.103 
Greece 4.9 36 0.158 
Hungary 5.2 31 0.152 
Iceland 9.2 5 0.080 
Ireland 7.7 15 0.121 
Italy 4.7 38 0.115 
Latvia 3.4 58 0.587 
Lithuania 3.8 50 0.322 
Luxembourg 8.8 11 0.530 
Malta N/A N/A 0.041 
Netherlands 9 8 0.105 
Poland 4.2 44 0.118 
Portugal 6.7 21 0.047 
Romania 3.3 63 0.307 
Russia Federation 2.4 82 0.245 
Slovakia 3.7 53 0.254 
Slovenia 6 25 0.222 
Spain 6.6 22 0.417 
Sweden 9.4 3 0.060 
Ukraine 2.6 75 0.474 
Note: A higher corruption score (higher rank) is indicative of less corruption.  Not all countries are 
included in the empirical analysis due to data limitations. 
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